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Comment
Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries: Applying
United States v. De Gross to All Heightened
Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
Dave Harbeck
Prosecutors should be forever mindful that selecting jurors in a
fair and nondiscriminatory manner is far more important than win-
ning a case with highly suspect or questionable tactics.
Judge Leon Higginbotham'
When money talks for the very last time and when nobody walks
a step behind; when there's only one race and that's mankind, then
we shall be free.
Garth Brooks2
In United States v. De Gross,3 the defendant, Juana Esper-
icueta De Gross, exercised seven peremptory challenges against
male venirepersons. The government objected, asserting that
this pattern of striking males violated the excluded jurors' con-
stitutional rights to equal protection of the laws.4 The trial
court upheld the government's objection and disallowed De
Gross's seventh peremptory challenge. 5 When the prosecutor
challenged an Hispanic venirewoman, De Gross asserted that
the challenge was unconstitutionally based on race.6 The court
rejected this protest and struck the potential juror.7 On appeal,
1. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higgin-
botham, J., concurring).
2. GARTH BROOKS, We Shall Be Free, on THE CHASE (Liberty Records
1992).
3. 960 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affrg. 913 F.2d 1417
(9th Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 1436.
5. Id.
6. On appeal, De Gross argued that removal of the only Hispanic
venireperson was unconstitutionally based upon the potential juror's race. Id.
Rather than addressing this claim, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed, sua sponte, whether the prosecutor's conduct constituted unconstitu-
tional gender discrimination. Id. at 1443 & n.15.
7. Id. at 1436.
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an en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit held that equal protec-
tion principles prohibit a party from peremptorily striking
venirepersons on the basis of gender.8 The court then deter-
mined that both parties' conduct established prima facie evi-
dence of gender discrimination.9
United States v. De Gross presents an opportunity to re-
view the scope, purpose, and usefulness of peremptory chal-
lenges.' 0 More specifically, De Gross considers whether equal
protection principles should prohibit parties from exercising
peremptory challenges based on a prospective juror's gender.
Because relatively few cases have applied equal protection anal-
ysis to non-racially-based peremptories, 11 De Gross can guide
other courts in developing this area of jurisprudence. Future
decisions can rely on De Gross's rationale in applying the Equal
Protection Clause' 2 to discriminatory peremptory challenges
8. I& at 1439.
9. Id. The en banc decision reached the same result as the original
three-member panel, affirming the trial court's denial of De Gross's seventh
peremptory challenge, but reversing and remanding the case. The court re-
versed based on the trial court's acceptance of the government's justification
for excluding the female Hispanic venireperson. Id at 1433
In reaching its decision, the en banc panel held that the government had
standing to object to a defendant's peremptory challenges and that the Fifth
Amendment limits a federal criminal defendant's peremptory challenges as
well as the government's strikes. Id These positions are in accord with re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992);
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), and are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
10. Courts and commentators dispute the use of peremptory challenges in
our judicial system. On the one hand, the peremptory challenge is "one of the
most important of the rights secured to the accused." Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). On the other, its use is "based upon seat-of-the-pants
instincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many cases
be hopelessly mistaken." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
11. The Supreme Court has conclusively held, however, that peremptory
challenges based upon a potential juror's race violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 476 U.S. at 89.
12. This Comment's analysis is limited to the equal protection doctrine.
While the Supreme Court has regulated jury selection through the Sixth
Amendment's provision requiring an impartial jury in criminal cases, the
Court has refused to apply the Sixth Amendment to the selection of the petit
jury. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (holding the Sixth
Amendment does not restrict the exclusion of a racial group at the peremp-
tory challenge stage); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) ("an exten-
sion of the fair-cross section requirement to petit juries would be unworkable
and unsound").
Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment does provide a useful analogy to ap-
plication of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment to require a jury which represents a cross-section of the commu-
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against members of numerous cognizable groups in addition to
race and gender.
This Comment fully endorses the holding in De Gross as a
balanced and reasonable solution to preventing discrimination
in the jury selection process while maintaining the usefulness
of peremptory challenges. This Comment argues, however,
that De Gross does not go far enough; future decisions should
extend the protection which De Gross provides for gender-
based peremptories to any group which warrants intermediate
or strict scrutiny 3  under traditional equal protection
principles.14
Part I analyzes the purposes of peremptory challenges in
our judicial system and reviews the history of the equal protec-
tion doctrine as applied to the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. Part II closely examines the facts, analysis, and
reasoning of De Gross. Part III addresses whether the Ninth
Circuit correctly decided De Gross and whether the doctrine
should extend beyond race and gender. This Comment con-
cludes that an extension of the principles enunciated in De
Gross to all heightened scrutiny equal protection groups would
further the purposes of both peremptory challenges and the
Equal Protection Clause.' 5
nity. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940). Under this cross-section test, the Supreme Court has al-
ready extended the Sixth Amendment to protection of other cognizable groups
such as gender. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) ("we think it is no
longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given auto-
matic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury
venires are almost totally male"); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). For
a summary of Sixth Amendment principles and cases, see JON M. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESEN-
TATIVE PANELS 48-83 (1977).
13. For an analysis of these categories, see infra notes 28-41 and accompa-
nying text. This Comment employs the term "heightened scrutiny" to de-
scribe both "intermediate" and "strict" scrutiny.
14. The Supreme Court and lower courts have not yet developed a com-
prehensive classification system under equal protection analysis. Instead, the
"pigeonholing" of various groups continues to be a source of controversy for
both courts and commentators. For these reasons, this Comment limits its po-
tential application to those groups that the Supreme Court currently regards
as warranting heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. Conse-
quently, if the Supreme Court expands these categories, lower courts should
apply this doctrine accordingly.
15. Two elements make this proposal unique. First, this Comment fully
applies equal protection analysis to all heightened scrutiny equal protection
groups. Some commentators have either reached summary conclusions, or an-
alyzed only one other group. See infra note 153. Another commentator con-
cluded that Batson warrants application of equal protection principles, but did
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
A. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Voir dire16 represents the stage of jury selection in which
either the judge or the attorneys question prospective jurors in
an attempt to uncover potential biases.17 The overriding pur-
pose of voir dire is to eliminate prospective jurors who cannot
be impartial about the parties or the case.' 8 Voir dire consists
of two stages: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.
Statutes and decisional law provide the authority for exercise
of both types of challenges. 19
When challenging for cause, attorneys may reject a poten-
tial juror on a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cogni-
not undertake such an analysis. See Jere W. Morehead, Exlploring the Fron-
tiers of Batson v. Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Ex-
tend to Gender?, 14 Am. J. TRiAL ADvoc. 289, 290 (1990).
Second, this Comment maintains that application of the doctrine will actu-
ally enhance the usefulness and effectiveness of peremptory challenges. Nu-
merous commentators claim that such wide application will either render
peremptories meaningless, or that the next logical step is the elimination of
peremptories. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
16. A historical translation of voir dire is "[To speak the truth" or "to see
what is said." VAN DYKE, supra note 12, at 140.
17. Id. at 139.
18. Id,
19. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991); see
also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for the use of peremp-
tory challenges in federal criminal cases:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to
20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6
peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is
entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more than one de-
fendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b) (1991). In civil suits, statutes govern the use of
peremptories:
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as
a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may
allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exer-
cised separately or jointly.
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1989).
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zable basis of partiality."20 In contrast, peremptory challenges
traditionally gave parties the right to excuse a venireperson
"without a reason stated, without inquiry, and without being
subject to the court's control."2 1  The Supreme Court funda-
mentally altered this seemingly unlimited right in Batson v.
Kentucky.22 The court in Batson held that peremptory chal-
lenges based on a potential juror's race are unconstitutional.23
B. THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
In recent years, courts have employed the Equal Protection
Clause24 frequently to protect the rights of individuals.25 The
Supreme Court has developed three levels of Equal Protection
scrutiny.26 When the government has treated members of a
cognizable group27 differently than others, the Supreme Court
determines the appropriate level of scrutiny based on the char-
20. 380 U.S. at 220.
21. 1d; accord 2 CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 383, at 361-62 (1982).
22. 476 U.S. at 89. Indeed, practitioners deemed this right to be so basic
that jury selection guides often advocated taking extreme measures in select-
ing juries. Perhaps the most commonly quoted collection is that of Clarence
Darrow: "Never take a German; they are bullheaded. Rarely take a Swede;
they are stubborn. Always take an Irishman or a Jew; they are the easiest to
move to emotional sympathy. Old men are generally more charitable and
kindly disposed than young men; they have seen more of the world and under-
stand it." THE OxFoRD BooK OF LEGAL ANECDOTES 101 (M. Gilbert 1986).
23. 476 U.S. at 89.
24. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. In order to invoke equal protection, state action must be present. A
court determines whether state action exists by applying a three-prong test.
First, the exercise of some right or privilege, such as peremptory challenges,
must have its source in state authority. Second, exercise of the right must de-
prive a party of some right. Third, the party charged with the deprivation
must fairly be said to be a state actor. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 939-42 (1982). This protection also extends to the federal government's ac-
tions via the Fifth Amendment's due process provision. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
26. Some commentators argue that the Supreme Court developed a fourth
level of equal protection analysis in City of C eburne v. Cleburne Learning
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne held that mentally retarded persons are not
a quasi-suspect class. Id. at 442-43. Despite its holding, the Court's analysis
represented a more rigid equal protection analysis than the Court normally ac-
cords to low scrutiny groups. See id. at 447-50.
27. In determining which groups conform to this definition, the Supreme
Court examines the following three factors: whether the group has histori-
cally suffered disparate treatment as a group, whether the group has immuta-
ble traits, and whether the group has historically been politically powerless.
Id. at 438; see also infra note 30.
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acteristics and historical treatment of the group. In each of the
three levels of scrutiny, a court examines the state's interests
advanced by the action and the relationship between the state's
interests and the action. If a court finds an insufficient state
interest to justify the action, the court need not inquire into the
adequacy of the relationship.
Under this equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court
applies strict scrutiny2s to infringements of fundamental
rights29 and distinctions based on suspect classes.30 These sus-
pect classes include race,31 alienage,32 national origin,33 and
religion.34 More recently, the Court has developed an interme-
diate scrutiny3 5 for quasi-suspect classes. Intermediate analysis
28. Under this strict scrutiny, the actor must demonstrate that a compel-
ling interest supports the distinction and prove that the action is necessary to
achieve that interest. E.g. id at 440. The Supreme Court often refers to the
latter prong as requiring the action to be sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id
29. Fundamental rights include activities such as access to the courts,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); voting, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
554 (1964); and interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
Because the Supreme Court has not deemed serving upon a jury to be a funda-
mental right under the Equal Protection Clause, fundamental rights analysis
is irrelevant for the purposes of this Comment.
30. The Court has defined suspect classes in various ways. See, e.g., Mas-
sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (per
curiam) (heightened scrutiny applies to groups with "unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotypical characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (a suspect class
is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process"); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) (heightened scrutiny for "discrete and insular minorities").
31. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
32. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). Despite heightened scrutiny, aliens are ineligible for
federal jury service. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1988). Consequently, in federal
courts, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to remove aliens is ir-
relevant since an attorney may challenge aliens for cause.
33. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
34. Strict scrutiny applies where a statute or practice is patently discrimi-
natory on its face. Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 141 (1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
35. Under this analysis, the actor must demonstrate that the action is sub-
stantially related to an important governmental purpose. Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
388 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). A close relationship be-
tween the action and the state interest assures that the state has "determined
[the classification] through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechan-
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applies to illegitimacy 36 and gender.3 7 When governmental ac-
tion is not based upon a fundamental right or membership in
one of the cognizable groups mentioned above, the Supreme
Court utilizes low scrutiny analysis.3s Courts employ low scru-
tiny analysis for economic measures, 39 and classifications in-
cluding wealth4 ° and age.41
In applying equal protection analysis, courts occasionally
prohibit certain conduct if based on race or other high scrutiny
groups, yet permit the same conduct if based on gender or
other middle scrutiny groups.4 A court may not reach such a
conclusion, however, without actually determining whether the
action can withstand intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the Supreme
Court's determination that gender receives intermediate scru-
tiny entitles an individual who has allegedly been discriminated
against on the basis of gender to have courts analyze equal pro-
tection claims at that level of scrutiny.
ical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions." 458 U.S. at 725-
26.
36. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980);
see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). But see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 781 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (illegitimacy does not warrant
heightened scrutiny).
37. Discrimination against males rather than females does not exempt the
action from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723;
see Caban, 441 U.S. at 388. The proper determination is whether males and
females are similarly situated. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199; Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
38. This doctrine requires only that the state have some rational basis for
its action, and places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 440; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). Under this
analysis, courts accept nearly any justification for a governmental action un-
less the plaintiff proves the action was arbitrary and capricious. Further,
courts do not require that the state's action eradicate all evils of the same ge-
nus. 336 U.S. at 110.
39. See, e.g., 336 U.S. at 110.
40. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist, 411 U.S. at 29.
41. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976) (per curiam).
42. For example, a court may conclude that a certain action withstands in-
termediate scrutiny, but does not withstand strict scrutiny. As a result, the
court would find the action constitutional if applied on the basis of gender, but
unconstitutional if applied on the basis of race. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape statute); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (military draft registration).
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C. APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES TO JURY
COMPOSITION.
The Supreme Court first invoked the Equal Protection
Clause to scrutinize the racial composition of juries more than
one hundred years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia.
43
Strauder found a denial of equal protection when the state
tried an African-American criminal defendant before a jury
from which blacks were excluded by statute.M
The Court again considered application of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to representation of minorities on juries in
Swain v. Alabama.45 In Swain, the Court reviewed the consti-
tutionality of a prosecutor's exclusion of African-American
venirepersons through the use of peremptory challenges.
Swain held that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to
the removal of blacks from a single, particular jury.46 While
Swain recognized that an equal protection violation was possi-
ble, the Court required the defendant to prove an absence of
blacks from juries "in case after case, whatever the circum-
stances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be" 47 and to demonstrate that the prosecutor was
responsible for the exclusion.48
The Supreme Court reconsidered Swain in Batson v. Ken-
tucky.4 9 Batson held that prosecutors could not use peremptory
challenges based solely on a potential juror's race or on the as-
sumption that African-American jurors as a group will be un-
43. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
44. Id. at 305. The West Virginia statute declared blacks ineligible to
serve on a grand or petit jury. Id.
45. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
46. The Court presumed that "the prosecutor is acting on acceptable con-
siderations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved
and the particular crime charged." Id, at 223.
47. Id Swain rejected an equal protection claim where there had not
been an African-American on a jury in the county in approximately fifteen
years. Id. at 226.
48. Id at 224. The Swain burden proved to be nearly insurmountable. In
the twenty years following Swain, only two defendants were able to meet this
burden. Marvin B. Steinberg, The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 27 CRIM. L. BuLL., May-June 1991, at 216, 221. (citing State v. Brown,
371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) & State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 162 (La. 1979)).
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson involved an African-American defendant
indicted on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. The
prosecutor peremptorily struck the only four African-Americans on the ve-
nire, and an all-white jury convicted the defendant on both counts. Id. at 82-
83.
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able to consider the case impartially.50 The Court reached its
holding after determining that the state's interest in providing
peremptories is to ensure a fair trial.51 Batson found that
rather than ensuring a fair trial, discriminatory use of per-
emptories caused harm to the defendant,52 harm to the ex-
cluded juror,53 and harm to the community at large.5
Batson rejected the onerous burden of Swain, holding in-
stead that a showing of discrimination in a single case was suffi-
cient to find a denial of equal protection.55 The Court then
implemented procedures for proving a case of prima facie dis-
crimination. The defendant must first demonstrate member-
ship in a cognizable racial group57 and that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors of the de-
fendant's race.58 Under this analysis, the defendant must prove
that the peremptories were based on race, rather than benign
50. Id. at 89. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction upon finding a
violation of these principles. Id at 100.
51. Id. at 85-87; accord Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Even Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting in Batson, recognized this state interest: "[The state interest in-
volved here has historically been regarded by this Court as substantial, if not
compelling. Peremptory challenges have long been viewed as a means to
achieve an impartial jury that will be sympathetic toward neither an accused
nor witnesses for the State on the basis of some shared factor of race, religion,
occupation, or other characteristic." Batson, 476 U.S. at 125.
52. Id. at 86 ("Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the pro-
tection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.").
53. Id. at 87 ("Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an
assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evi-
dence presented at a trial."). Further, exclusion of a person on the basis of
group membership stigmatizes both the individual and the group.
54. Id. ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.").
55. The Court's recognition that the defendant could show unconstitu-
tional discrimination solely on the facts of the case at bar represents the major
distinction from Swain. Id at 95.
56. The Court borrowed the procedure for shifting the burden of proof
from the disparate treatment cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. at 94 n.18.
For convenience, this Comment describes the burden established in Bat-
son by applying "prosecutor" and "defendant" to the conduct which each com-
mitted in Batson. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the
parties are interchangeable. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
57. The Court cited Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977), as the
source of this phrase. In defining cognizable group, Castaneda required the
defendant to establish that the group is one that is a "recognizable, distinct
class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or ap-
plied." Id.
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Court has subsequently modified this lat-
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factors.59 The defendant must then raise an inference that the
prosecutor took advantage of this discriminatory aspect of per-
emptories to exclude potential jurors on account of their race.60
The defendant can meet this burden by either proving the
existence of purposeful discrimination or establishing proof of
disproportionate impact upon the cognizable group through cir-
cumstantial evidence which "demonstrate[s] unconstitutionality
because . . .the discrimination is very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds."'' S If the defendant is able to establish such
a prima facie showing, the prosecutor must explain the racial
exclusion by demonstrating employment of racially neutral
procedures in the peremptory process. 62 If the prosecution dem-
onstrates use of neutral procedures, the burden shifts back to
the defendant, leaving the defendant with the ultimate burden
of persuasion.6 3
Although Batson applied equal protection analysis to the
use of peremptory challenges,6 the Court did not analyze the
conduct in terms of a compelling state interest which is "suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored." Additionally, the Court limited its
consideration to the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges against African-American criminal defendants.65 Batson
thus sent contradictory signals to lower courts. On the one
hand, it appears that the Court limited Batson to black criminal
defendants and did not employ ordinary equal protection no-
menclature. On the other, Batson expressly left the decision's
implementation to lower courts66 without articulating a defini-
tive decision-making standard or delineating the scope of the
ter requirement, since the excluded jurors and the defendant no longer need
to share the same race. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
59. In attempting to prove that the prosecutor's actions were racially mo-
tivated, Batson allows the defendant to rely on the fact that peremptory chal-
lenges permit "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." 476
U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
The Court has recently reviewed this requirement in Hernandez v. New
York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). The Court held that a prosecutor's challenges of
two Hispanic jurors were based on a difficulty in understanding the language
and the case, and not on race.
60. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
61. Id at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id. at 94 n.18.
64. Id. at 89.
65. See e.g., id. ("the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's
case against a black defendant") (emphasis added).
66. Id at 99-100 & n.24.
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holding. Unsurprisingly, lower courts have exhibited confusion
and inconsistency in implementing the decision.6 7
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions may assist lower
courts in the application of this doctrine. In Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co., 68 the Court extended the Batson doctrine to
civil cases. Powers v. Ohio 69 applied Batson to cases in which
the defendant and the excluded juror do not share the same
race. In Georgia v. McCollum,7" the Court recently decided
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits federal criminal
defendants, in addition to prosecutors, from engaging in
purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges.71
Numerous lower courts have addressed the issue of
whether Batson applies to gender-based peremptory challenges.
In United States v. Hamilton,72 the Fourth Circuit refused to
extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges. In
Hamilton, the government's attorney freely admitted that he
exercised three peremptory challenges against women to en-
sure that the jury would not be overly sympathetic to the fe-
male defendant.73 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the absence of broader language in Batson reflected an in-
tention to prohibit only racially-based peremptory challenges.74
The court bolstered its conclusion by noting the "important po-
sition of the peremptory challenge in our jury system."75 Other
courts have adopted an analogous approach. State v. Oliviera76
67. For a compilation of the numerous questions left unanswered by Bat-
son, see Bonnie L. Mayfield, Batson and Groups Other Than Blacks: A Strict
Scrutiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 377, 379-83 (1988); see also
Morehead, supra note 15, at 289 n.3 (noting that over 700 cases cite Batson and
indicating a number of commentaries on the case).
68. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
69. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
70. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
71. Id The court held that the defendant's action constituted state action.
De Gross also addressed this issue, reaching the same conclusion. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
72. 850 F.2d. 1038 (1988), cert dismissed, sub. nom. Washington v. United
States, 489 U.S. 1069 (1990).
73. 850 F.2d at 1041.
74. 1d, at 1042 ("While the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause un-
doubtedly apply to prohibit discrimination due to gender in other contexts,
there is no evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court would apply normal
equal protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory
challenges.").
75. Id, at 1042-43.
76. 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987). The state's attorney had used six of seven
peremptory challenges to remove male venirepersons. I&L at 869.
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assumed that the Batson court was aware of a possible broader
application, but "clearly preferred to limit the new standard to
racially-based discrimination. ' 77 Oliviera found further sup-
port for this conclusion since the use of gender as a criterion
for exercising peremptory challenges would render "all such
challenges . . . inherently suspect."78  In Eiland v. State,79 a
Maryland court noted the inconsistency of Batson with equal
protection principles, 0 but held that enlarging the doctrine
"would be presumptuous on our part."' The Eighth Circuit8 2
and numerous state courts83 have reached similar conclusions
without considering the merits of the claims.
People v. Irizarry" represents one of the few instances in
which a court willingly looked beyond the narrow language of
Batson to determine whether the doctrine enunciated in Batson
extends beyond race and nationalityas In Irizarry, a New York
appellate court analyzed Batson by evaluating the harm to the
defendant, the excluded juror, and the community.86 Instead of
77. Id at 870. The Oliviera court asserted that "the [Batson] Court re-
fer[ed] solely to discrimination based upon race[,]" thereby widening the
Court's preference to limit the standard to racially based discrimination. Id.
(emphasis in original).
78. Id, (emphasis in original).
79. 607 A.2d 42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
80. "It is hard to imagine why [the Equal Protection Clause] should not
also be aimed at gender-based peremptories directed at women-or at men. It
is hard to imagine that it should not be aimed at peremptories based upon a
juror's religion." Id. at 58.
81. Id. at 59. This position is contrary to Batson's direction leaving imple-
mentation to lower courts. See supra note 67.
82. United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1540 (8th Cir. 1990) (the
government's preference of men over women in narcotics cases does not show
a Batson violation); United States v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1989)
(prosecutor's explanation that he will strike women from street crime prose-
cutions is not the type of general assertion disapproved in Batson).
83. Dysart v. State, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (Batson applies
only to racial discrimination, not to gender-based discrimination); Hannan v.
Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (same); State v. Adams,
533 So.2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1988), writ denied, 540 So.2d 338 (La. 1989)
(same); State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v.
Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989) (same).
84. 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (mem.).
85. The court considered extension of Batson where the prosecutor exer-
cised nine peremptory challenges against venirewomen. Id. at 279-80. The de-
fendant, as a male, was declared to have standing to raise the claim. Id. at 280.
Interestingly, the state conceded that Batson applies to gender-based discrimi-
nation. Id.
86. Id. at 280. The court departed from traditional equal protection analy-
sis, holding that "strict scrutiny" analysis applies to gender-based peremptory
challenges. Id.
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explaining its analysis, however, the court simply held that Bat-
son applied to gender-based discrimination and that excluding
jurors solely because they are women denied both the defend-
ant and the jurors equal protection of the laws.8 7 Other deci-
sions have prohibited gender-based peremptories under specific
provisions of state constitutions.8 8
In addition to the gender discrimination cases, lower courts
have attempted to determine whether other groups constitute a
cognizable group within the rationale of Batson.8 9 These deci-
sions have considered peremptories based on national origin,90
religion,91 age,92 and other subcategories. 93
87. Id. at 281.
88. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990) (holding that the state
constitution guarantees the right to serve on a jury and cannot be taken away
for any prohibited reasons of race, religion, sex, or ancestry); State v. Gonza-
les, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65 (1991) (holding
that exercise of gender-based peremptories violates state constitution); People
v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same); see also Di Donato v.
Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding gender is a cognizable
group and peremptories based on gender are therefore prohibited under the
federal and state constitutions); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d 1148
(Mass. 1991) (addressing whether peremptories in a rape case were based on
race or gender).
89. In reviewing De Gross, this Comment necessarily focuses upon gender-
based peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, this focus produces several advan-
tages. Lower court decisions considering an extension of Batson to gender
have produced markedly different approaches and results. Application of Bat-
son to gender also represents the broadest expansion of the doctrine, an ex-
pansion a number of commentators oppose. See, e.g., infra note 148 and
accompanying text. Thus, by examining the effect of applying equal protec-
tion principles to gender-based peremptory challenges, this Comment will be
able to assess the validity of the commentators' concerns.
90. E.g., Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 99 (1991) (Irish defendant not within Batson); United
States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2nd Cir. 1990) (Hispanics constitute a cogniza-
ble group under Batson); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir.
1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988) (all ethnic and racial minority groups
constitute a cognizable racial group). The Supreme Court has determined
that, at least for Sixth Amendment purposes, Mexican-Americans constitute a
clearly identifiable class. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977); see
also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(classifications based on national origin are presumptively invalid).
91. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1158 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
92. United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671-72 (4th Cir. 1989); Graham
v. Lynaugh, 854 F.2d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 492 U.S. 915 (1989);
United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 544-45 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom. Impemba v. United States, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
93. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992) (African-American females); United States v. Den-
nis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037
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Batson v. Kentucky unequivocally found peremptory chal-
lenges based upon the race of the potential juror unconstitu-
tional.9 4 Although Batson left implementation to the lower
courts, the Court failed to declare the scope of its holding. This
lack of direction has led to diverse results. Typically, lower
courts have ignored the possible merits of an equal protection
claim, holding that Batson applies only to peremptories based
on race.95 At least one decision determined that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges.9
II. THE DE GROSS DECISION.
Prior to United States v. De Gross, lower courts applied two
distinct approaches to gender-based peremptory challenges.
Those refusing to extend Batson v. Kentucky adopted a narrow
reading of Batson's language. 97 Those favoring application to
gender-based peremptories relied upon Batson's broader ration-
ale.98 Arising in the midst of these conflicting positions, De
Gross will play a substantial role in defining the scope of per-
emptory challenges and in determining whether peremptories
will continue to be meaningful to practitioners as a fundamen-
tal part of the jury system.99
In United States v. De Gross,100 Juana Espericueta De
(1987) (African-American males); United States v. Grandison, 721 F. Supp. 743,
745 n.1 (D. Md. 1988) (mem.), aff'd, 885 F.2d 143 (1989), cert denied, 495 U.S.
934 (1990) (white women married to African-American men).
94. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
95. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
96. People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (mem.).
97. Indeed, the Court cautioned that there is no constitutional right to
peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986); Stilson v.
United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). The Supreme Court has expressly rec-
ognized that peremptory challenges "may be withheld altogether .... ." Fra-
zier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948). Such language has led to
concern, particularly among practitioners, that peremptories will soon be
either eliminated or ineffectual. See infra note 183 and accompanying text
(noting a number of commentators favoring abolition of peremptory
challenges).
98. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions indicate the appropriateness of
expanding the doctrine beyond the facts of Batson. Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89
(1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991).
99. Courts, commentators, and practitioners have traditionally viewed
peremptory challenges as a permanent, necessary, and inevitable part of the
jury system. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. at 1364; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
at 98; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 376 (1892); VAN DYKE, supra note 12, at 166.
100. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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Gross pled not guilty to three counts of aiding and abetting the
transportation of an alien within the United States.' 0 ' During
voir dire, De Gross exercised seven peremptory challenges
against male venirepersons. 10 2 The government objected to the
challenge of the seventh male, Wendell Tiffany, asserting that
this pattern of striking males violated the excluded juror's con-
stitutional rights to equal protection of the laws. 0 3 After De
Gross offered no explanation for the removal of Tiffany, the
trial court disallowed the peremptory challenge. 1 4 De Gross
raised a similar objection when the prosecutor challenged
Herminia Tellez, the only Hispanic on the venire.'0 5 De Gross
claimed that the removal of Tellez was based on race and
therefore unconstitutional under Batson. The government jus-
tified the exclusion of Tellez as merely an attempt to get "a
more representative community of men and women on the
jury."'06 The trial court accepted this explanation and struck
Tellez.10 7 The impaneled jury, consisting of three men and
nine women, convicted De Gross. 0 8
On appeal,10 9 a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit
held that both De Gross's challenge of Tiffany and the govern-
ment's challenge of Tellez violated the constitutional rights of
the excluded venirepersons."10 The court found each party
based peremptories on the venireperson's gender in violation of
equal protection principles. Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ordered a rehearing en banc."'
On rehearing, the en banc panel held that equal protection
principles"12 prohibit a party from peremptorily striking
101. Id. at 1435.
102. That De Gross involved exclusion of males rather than females is ir-
relevant to equal protection analysis. See supra note 37.
103. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1435-36.
104. The trial court required De Gross to justify the challenge only after
finding a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. I&. at 1436.
105. Although there may have been another Hispanic woman on the ve-
nire, the judge had previously removed her for cause. I. at 1436 n.2.
106. Id at 1436. Ten women and two men were seated in the jury box at
that point. Id- at 1436 n.3.
107. Id. at 1436.
108. Id-
109. De Gross appealed the trial court's denial of her peremptory challenge
of Tiffany. Id-
110. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1424-26 (9th Cir. 1990).
111. United States v. De Gross, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991).
112. Application of equal protection principles was critical to the court's
analysis: "It distinguishes race and gender from other factors that are not im-
proper bases for exclusion from juries, for example, one's occupation." 960
F.2d 1433, 1438 n.8 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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venirepersons on the basis of gender.113 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court noted the Fourth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Hamilton,114 but reasoned that the narrow language of
Batson belied Batson's broader rationale.1 5
The court applied the equal protection doctrine to per-
emptories based on gender after analyzing the various harms
such peremptories cause. 1 6 In its analysis, the en banc panel
first noted that gender discrimination in the judicial system
stimulates community prejudice which impedes equal justice
for women.117 Next, De Gross recognized that a defendant is
entitled to a jury chosen in a nondiscriminatory manner.118 Fi-
nally, De Gross found that peremptories based on gender, like
those based on race, harm the excluded venireperson.119
After determining that the harms identified in Batson were
equally applicable to gender-based peremptory challenges, the
court considered whether such challenges violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The court acknowledged that race and gen-
der receive different levels of scrutiny under equal protection
analysis. 20  Relying heavily on the language of Batson, De
113. The court applied its decision to the peremptory challenges of a fed-
eral criminal defendant. I& at 1439-42. The concurrence disagreed with the
majority with regard to whether state action existed, and therefore did not
consider whether Batson extended to gender-based peremptory challenges. Id.
at 1447 n.7. The Supreme Court has since determined that state action does
exist for peremptory challenges, regardless of which party exercises such per-
emptories. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (1991).
114. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
115. 960 F.2d at 1438 n.6. "In so holding, Hamilton relied upon the fact
that the Court's language was couched in racial terms. We believe that there
is no more significance to that language than the fact that the case involved
peremptory strikes against black venirepersons. Batson's rationale applies
equally well to gender-based peremptory strikes." Id
116. Id at 1438. The Batson Court recognized that discrimination during
jury selection harms the excluded venirepersons, undermines public confi-
dence in the judicial system, and stimulates community prejudice. Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986). See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text.
117. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438 (citing Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). The court concluded that "[p]ermitting gender-based
peremptory challenges would simply affirm an erroneous and unconstitutional
presumption that women are less qualified than men to serve as jurors." Id
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1439 ("[Full community participation in the administration of
the criminal justice system, whether measured by race or gender, is critical to
public confidence in the system's fairness.").
120. Id. The Constitution permits gender discrimination only if substan-
tially related to an important governmental interest. Id.
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Gross concluded that the use of gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges nevertheless violated equal protection principles. 21 De
Gross determined that a state's interest in permitting peremp-
tory challenges is limited to impaneling a fair and impartial
jury and found that challenges based solely on a potential ju-
ror's gender are not based on an inability to be ipartial.122
Instead, such challenges are based "either on the false assump-
tion that members of a certain group are unqualified to serve as
jurors, or on the false assumption that members of certain
groups are unable to consider impartially the case against a
member or a nonmember of their group."'' 2 The court there-
fore held that gender-based peremptory challenges do not
achieve important governmental interests and violate equal
protection principles.2 4
The court next addressed whether the challenges by each
party violated these legal principles. Following the presump-
tions established in Batson, De Gross upheld the trial court's in-
ference that the defendant challenged Tiffany because of his
gender.125 De Gross's refusal to explain her challenge consti-
tuted a failure to carry her burden and justified the district
court's disallowance of the peremptory challenge. The Ninth
Circuit further found that the prosecutor's challenge of Tellez
established a prima facie case of gender discrimination.126 The
prosecutor's statement that he desired more men on the jury
compelled this conclusion.127 Because the trial court failed to
disallow the challenge of Tellez, the en banc panel reversed the
trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.12S
III. BEYOND DE GROSS: HOW FAR SHOULD THE
BATSON DOCTRINE EXTEND?
United States v. De Gross is among the first cases to hold
that Batson v. Kentucky applies to non-racially-based peremp-
tory challenges. As such, De Gross raises several issues. The
121. Id
122. Id-
123. Id. at 1439 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1442. The en banc panel upheld the lower court's determination
after noting that De Gross used seven of her eight peremptory challenges
against males. After challenging Tiffany, ten women and two men were
seated on the jury, and only one man remained in the venire. Id
126. Id at 1442-43.
127. Id. at 1443.
128. I&
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first addresses whether Batson's language and rationale war-
rant the application of equal protection principles to groups
other than race. This Comment asserts that De Gross correctly
applied Batson to non-racially-based peremptory challenges.
The second issue concerns whether courts should further ex-
pand this doctrine to protect cognizable groups other than race
and gender. This Comment contends that equal protection
principles and Batson justify prohibiting peremptory challenges
against members of any cognizable group which warrant inter-
mediate or strict scrutiny under traditional equal protection
analysis. Third, De Gross raises the issue of whether continued
extension of the Batson doctrine will render peremptory chal-
lenges virtually meaningless. This Comment argues that limit-
ing peremptory challenges to those based on low scrutiny equal
protection groups will advance the purposes of, and respect for,
peremptory challenges and will promote the rationale of the
Equal Protection Clause.
A. DE GROSS CORRECTLY APPLIED BATSON TO NON-RACIALLY-
BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
In United States v. De Gross, the Ninth Circuit quickly dis-
missed the notion that the Supreme Court intended to limit
Batson v. Kentucky to racial groups. 12 9 De Gross's holding di-
rectly contradicts the Fourth Circuit's analysis in United States
v. Hamilton.130 This circuit split raises the issue of whether
Batson's language and rationale warrant an extension of these
principles to non-racially-based peremptory challenges.
The Supreme Court's language strongly supports the view
that lower courts should not narrowly construe Batson. First,
the Batson majority did not attempt or intend to limit the deci-
sion to racial groups.' 31 On the contrary, the decision expressly
129. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
130. The Fourth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court expressly lim-
ited Batson to racially motivated peremptory challenges. United States v.
Hamilton, 850 F.2d. 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert dismissed, sub. nom. Wash-
ington v. United States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989). The reasoning applied in Hamil-
ton came, in large part, from Justice Burger's dissent in Batson, where the
Chief Justice contended that the Court applied a "hybrid" equal protection
analysis which could be limited to peremptory exclusions of African-American
criminal defendants. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Although Justice Burger believed the decision should be limited to race, he ad-
mitted that the Court "invokes general equal protection principles in support
of its holding." Id. at 123. Burger fails to explain the incompatibility of these
two positions.
131. Only Justice Burger's dissent advocated this position. See id. at 123-24.
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left implementation to the lower courts. 32 Additionally, the
Supreme Court's decision adopted the "cognizable group" stan-
dard. 33 By espousing the "cognizable group" criterion, Batson
implicitly recognized that certain groups must receive addi-
tional protection because of their historical and disparate treat-
ment. Because the "cognizable group" principle lies at the
heart of the equal protection doctrine,' 34 Batson must extend
beyond race.1 35
In addition to Batson's specific language, the decision's ra-
tionale reveals the Supreme Court's unmistakable intent to in-
corporate traditional equal protection concepts.136 Application
of equal protection principles is implicit in Batson's overruling
of Swain v. Alabama.137 Indeed, limiting Batson to racial
groups would be entirely inconsistent with the policies of equal
protection. 38 The equal protection doctrine does not allow
courts to apply strict scrutiny to racially-based classifications,
yet apply absolutely no scrutiny to alleged discrimination
132. Id. at 99-100 n.24.
133. Id at 96. Batson's use of "cognizable racial group" illustrates only that
the discriminatory peremptory challenge in the case concerned exclusion of a
member of a racial group. See United States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438
n.6 (1992) (en bane).
134. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees equal treatment of similarly
situated individuals. When governmental action disproportionately impacts
upon "discrete and insular minorities," the Supreme Court will apply height-
ened scrutiny. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
135. Traditional equal protection analysis supports this Comment's asser-
tion that courts must apply the Batson doctrine with the level of scrutiny nor-
mally accorded to various groups. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying
text.
136. Although Batson does not utilize the language of "strict scrutiny" or
"compelling state interest," the Supreme Court conceded that equal protection
principles were applicable. 476 U.S. at 84.
137. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). Swain explicitly permitted consideration of group affiliation, even if
irrelevant to the goal of achieving an impartial jury. Id. at 220-21. The funda-
mental philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause, however, prohibits consid-
eration of group affiliations without justifiable reason. See supra notes 27-28.
By overruling Swain and holding that peremptory challenges cannot be based
solely upon group affiliation, Batson incorporates this fundamental principle
in its doctrine and supports the rationale of the Equal Protection Clause.
138. Donald C. Hanratty, Note, Moving Closer to Eliminating Discrimina-
tion in Jury Selection: A Challenge to the Peremptory, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 204, 228 (1989) (citing Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 346-47 (1987)) ("[I]t is
not clear how the Batson decision can rest on the equal protection clause and
not incorporate general equal protection law principles."); Barbara Isabel
Campbell, Note, Batson v. Kentucky Two Years Later, 24 TULSA L.J. 63, 77
(1988) ("To apply Batson only to blacks... would be a strange application of
the equal protection clause.").
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against other cognizable groups.139 Any other reading of the
equal protection doctrine is inapposite to the long-accepted ap-
plication of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the confines of
race.140
Analysis of the harms identified by Batson likewise sup-
ports the conviction that the Supreme Court did not intend to
limit the decision to racial discrimination. Batson illustrated
the existence of harm to the defendant, the excluded juror, and
the community at large.141 As De Gross accurately points out,
the stigmatization, stereotyping, and fairness concerns which
peremptory challenges raise are wholly applicable to perempto-
ries based on gender.1' Like the historical racial discrimina-
tion against African-Americans, women have faced "a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination."'14 3 Based on this
shared history, De Gross acknowledged that exclusion of
venirepersons from juries based solely on their gender gener-
ates these same concerns.
Under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held
that it is unconstitutional to exclude women as a class from the
venire based solely on their sex.14 De Gross reached the same
conclusion with respect to peremptory challenges after analyz-
ing the language and rationale of Batson. The court concluded
that the harms present in Batson were also present when based
139. This is different from claiming that only racial groups may be pro-
tected from certain arbitrary actions. Instead, such a requirement simply com-
pels courts to consider extension of protection to other groups prior to outright
rejection. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
140. Such a position would represent a return to the standard enunciated
in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
141. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
142. De Gross, like Batson, restricts its language to the specific group at is-
sue. Thus, the De Gross decision does not address the issue of whether the
harms also impact upon other cognizable groups. This Comment addresses
this issue infra in Section III(B).
143. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). As De Gross points
out, "[t]he history of juries in the United States is one of pervasive, govern-
ment sanctioned exclusion of women." United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The court then noted that "[ilt was not
until 1975 that the Supreme Court held that systematically excluding women
from juries violates defendants' Sixth Amendment rights." Id
144. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 552, 537 (1975). "[T]he exclusion of wo-
men from jury panels may at times be highly prejudicial to the defendants."
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946). In Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 175 (1986), the Court concluded that the exclusion of women "raised
at least the possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily
skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the com-
mon-sense judgment of the community."
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on gender and therefore held that the rationale of the Batson
decision equally applied to gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges.145 The language and rationale of Batson, Supreme
Court precedent, and solid reasoning all support the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in De Gross.
Several courts' 46 and commentators147 have illogically re-
stricted Batson to racially-based peremptory challenges. The
decisions posit that because Batson's language failed to include
other groups, courts should not extend Batson beyond that do-
main.148 This rationale, however, fundamentally misconceives
Batson. Because Batson dealt with black criminal defendants,
one can readily understand the Court's references to that
group's exclusion.149 By failing to undertake Batson's legal
analysis, these courts violate fundamental equal protection
145. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438. English common law prohibited women
from jury service under the doctrine of propter defectum sexus, or "defect of
sex." Id. (citing 2 WIaxLAm BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES 362). Evidence of
this distressing history is prevalent. A Supreme Court Justice once pro-
claimed: "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently un-
fits it for many of the occupations of civil life." Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
146. See e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d. 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
dismissed, sub. noma. Washington v. United States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989); State
v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (RI. 1987). Several Supreme Court Justices have also
espoused such a conviction. Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[o]utside the
uniquely sensitive area of race the ordinary rule that a prosecutor may strike a
juror without giving any reason applies." Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S.
940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). Chief Justice
Burger concluded that Batson clearly contained a limitation to race-based dis-
crimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-24 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
147. E.g. Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory
Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1053 (1991) (By stressing race, "the
Court implicitly licensed discrimination on nonracial grounds").
148. United States v. Hamilton is an example of a court refusing to analyze
a claim of gender discrimination on its merits, reasoning that "if the Supreme
Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished the peremptory challenge
or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of race, gender, age or
other group classification." Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042. Washington v. United
States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989). This Comment argues that these trial courts
wrongly permitted such challenges. Further, the appellate courts should have
recognized the legal errors and reversed the trial court decisions.
149. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438 n.6; see also Shirley S. Sagawa, Batson v.
Kentucky: Will it Keep Women on the Jury?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 14,
22 (1987-88) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976)) ("When the
Court makes a statement about equal protection, its literal holding often re-
fers specifically to the group that is the subject of the litigation. However, the
Court often does not intend its decision to be so limited.").
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principles, 5 0 ignore Batson's directive to implement the deci-
sion,151 abdicate their judicial responsibility, and deprive liti-
gants of their right to have their claims fully considered.
152
B. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS REQUIRES APPLICATION OF
THE DOCTRINE TO ALL HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
GROUPS.
United States v. De Gross determined that Batson's lan-
guage and rationale, coupled with Supreme Court precedent,
warranted the inference that the Batson doctrine should pro-
hibit gender-based peremptories. 15 3 As with Batson, De Gross
addresses only the group at issue before the court. Thus, future
courts could avoid applying the Batson doctrine to other groups
by construing De Gross narrowly.1M This Comment contends
that rather than adopting such a narrow reading, future deci-
sions should extend the protection which De Gross provides for
gender-based peremptories to any group which warrants
150. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
151. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
152. A litigant asserting unconstitutional gender discrimination in the
jury selection process is entitled to a principled resolution of this
claim. Because no issue of gender discrimination was presented in
Batson and because the Supreme Court did not discuss the merits of
this issue even in dictum, the burden of providing a reasoned consid-
eration of the litigant's claim must fall initially upon lower courts.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Overweight Schoolteacher from New Jersey and
Other Tales: The Peremptory Challenge after Batson, 25 CRiM. L. BULL., 57, 64
n.31 (1989).
153. A doctrine which prohibits peremptories only on the basis of race and
gender is only a slight improvement over a doctrine which prohibits only ra-
cial discrimination. For a contrary view, see S. Alexandria Jo, Comment, Re-
construction of the Peremptory Challenge System- A Look at Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. L.J. 1305, 1329 (1991) ("Prohibition of gender-
based peremptory challenge is not only a logical extension of the Batson prohi-
bition, but is also the logical place to end the restructuring of the peremptory
challenge."); see also Mayfield, supra note 67, at 404 (exploring the extension
of Batson only to other strict scrutiny classes of race, alienage, and national
origin. The author then states that she will not discuss extension to other
groups because she believes such an argument would fail).
154. Such an approach would fail to create a just and consistent method of
dealing with discriminatory peremptory challenges and would tempt attorneys
to "go as far as they can" in the exercise of discriminatory peremptories in the
hope that the judge is willing to overlook their indiscretions. In one recent
article, the author addresses a state's interest of impartiality under the Equal
Protection Clause. Based on this analysis and extensive policy reasoning, the
author concludes gender based peremptories violate equal protection princi-
ples, yet neglects to apply this rationale beyond gender. Note, Beyond Batson:
Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1920,
1922 (1992).
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heightened scrutiny under traditional equal protection
principles.1 55
A two-part analysis demonstrates the appropriateness of
this conclusion. First, the three types of harms which Batson
enunciated most often occur when a court permits perempto-
ries based on membership in, or characteristics of, a group
which receives heightened scrutiny under equal protection
analysis. When these harms are intensified, Batson's rationale
fully applies. Second, the only acknowledged state's interest in
permitting peremptories is to ensure an impartial jury.156
When parties exercise peremptories against members of a
heightened scrutiny group, this interest must be either substan-
tial or compelling. 5 7 Because parties base discriminatory per-
emptories only on stereotypes which do not enhance the
likelihood of an impartial jury, the state's interest is
insufficient.' 58
1. Analysis of the Harms Which Batson Articulated.
Batson' 59 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions' 60 rec-
ognized that peremptory challenges which eliminate members
of cognizable groups harm the defendant, the excluded juror,
and the community as a whole.
Discriminatory peremptory challenges harm the defendant
by compromising the representative quality of the jury.161 The
155. This proposal results in a malleable doctrine which may change as cer-
tain groups are granted more or less scrutiny under traditional equal protec-
tion analysis. For instance, if courts applied middle level scrutiny to age
classifications, peremptories based on age should be prohibited.
156. See infra note 174. Even Swain v. Alabama acknowledged this inter-
est: "The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of parti-
ality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they
try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and
not otherwise." 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
157. See supra notes 28 and 35 and accompanying text.
158. Several commentators have accepted this type of application. See
Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 945 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("[We may not pick and choose which constitutional
rights we will and will not vindicate in monitoring the jury selection pro-
cess."); Morehead, supra note 15, at 303 ("The spirit of Batson compels protec-
tion of any cognizable group, including women, that has historically been the
victim of discrimination").
159. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-88.
160. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080, 2088
(1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368-72 (1991).
161. "[D]iscriminatory selection procedures make 'juries ready weapons for
officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered
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Supreme Court has acknowledged, especially in criminal cases,
the importance of assuring a defendant of fair proceedings. 162
Prejudicial peremptories also injure the excluded juror. 63
To have an effective system of justice, citizens must have the
opportunity to participate in the administration of justice164 and
the right to be considered on an individual, rather than on a
group, basis. 65 Further, the exclusion of jurors may have a
profound impact upon their opinion of our judicial system166
and upon the excluded group as a whole.16 7
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the detrimental impact discriminatory peremptory chal-
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities."' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 86 n.8 (1986) (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting))
162. The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal
defendant... that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in ac-
cordance with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not
be accepted or understood in those terms if the jury is chosen by un-
lawful means at the outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a
criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the prosecutor excludes
jurors at his or her own trial on account of race.
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
163. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 795, 87 (1986); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
164. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991). "An individual juror does
not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess
the right not to be excluded from one on account of race." Id. at 1370. This
notion applies equally to gender, religion, and other cognizable groups.
165. Batson, 476 U.S. 87. Such peremptory challenges 'harm the excluded
venireperson because discriminatory challenges are based on group member-
ship whereas juror competence depends upon an individual's qualifications."
United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990).
166. "A venireperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers a
profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character. The re-
jected juror may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts, as may the de-
fendant f his or her objections cannot be heard." Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
167. United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (Gender
discrimination in the judicial system is "a stimulant to community prejudice
which impedes fair treatment for women."); Sagawa, supra note 149, at 33 &
41 ("Striking women from a jury in reliance on these maxims perpetuates
damaging views of women." Sagawa further notes that the stigma of an ex-
cluded group "carries over into unknown other facets of life, affecting not only
the way others see the excluded group, but the way its members view them-
selves.").
Based on the harms which such generalizations cause, the Supreme Court
has condemned unequivocally the use of racial stereotypes to procure an im-
partial jury. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991)
("[I]f race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the
price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution. Other means exist
for litigants to satisfy themselves of a jury's impartiality without using skin
color as a test."); Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
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lenges have upon the community as a whole.1 68  Batson
concluded that such practices "undermine public confidence in
the fairness of our system of justice."'' 69 In this situation, "it is
not necessary to assume the excluded group will consistently
vote as a class in order to conclude . . . that its exclusion de-
prives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented."'70
In Batson, the Supreme Court found that each of these
harms arise when a party exercises racially-based peremptory
challenges. De Gross strongly emphasized that each harm oc-
curs not exclusively with racially-based peremptory challenges,
but also with gender-based peremptory challenges.171 Upon ex-
amination, it becomes apparent that these harms will develop
whenever parties base peremptories upon membership in, or at-
tributes of, a heightened scrutiny equal protection group.
When a party exercises peremptories against heightened scru-
tiny groups, the opposing party is more likely to recognize the
prejudicial nature of the challenge, the excluded venireperson
is more inclined to lose confidence in our system of justice, and
the public as a whole is more likely either to perpetuate the
stereotype or view the decision as biased and unfair. 72 While
168. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). With the present use of
peremptory challenges, many believe that their use is the "most significant
means by which prejudice is injected into the jury selection system." Stein-
berg, supra note 48, at 216 (quoting Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation:
Serving a Democratic Institution, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 247, 270 (1973)).
169. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. Subsequent cases elaborated on this notion.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991) ("If our
society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize
that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and
causes continued hurt and injury."); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371
(1991) ("The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt
over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to
the law throughout the trial of the cause").
170. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
Fulfilling the goal of impartiality requires that we provide an op-
portunity for the full range of views. Our ability to elicit the commu-
nity's conscience on the difficult issues of justice is diminished by the
exclusion of broad groups of people, and the legitimacy of the jury's
verdict is thereby impaired.
VAN DYKE, supra note 12, at 42.
171. United States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
172. For instance, if a party peremptorily challenges a Buddhist venireper-
son based solely upon that person's religion (perhaps because the opposing
party also belongs to the Buddhist religion), the challenge will more likely of-
fend and anger the opposing party, the excluded venireperson, and the Bud-
dhist community. Compare this situation to a peremptory challenge based on
a potential juror's inability to stay awake. This latter example is unlikely to
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
these harms cause grave concerns when applied to members of
cognizable groups, the considerations lessen greatly and require
a lower level of equal protection scrutiny when removal of per-
sons occurs based on benign characteristics or attributes not di-
rectly associated with members of a cognizable group. 73
2. Peremptories and the State's Interests.
The Batson holding reconfirmed that a state's interest in
permitting peremptory challenges is to ensure a fair and impar-
tial jury. 74 Determination of this governmental interest,175
however, extends only to ensuring a fair trial and no further.176
In order to apply the equal protection doctrine, one must
determine whether peremptory challenges will advance the
state's interests. Ideally, a party can exercise peremptory chal-
lenges based on the party's perception of a particular juror's
ability to fairly try the case. Peremptories exercised on the ba-
sis of membership in, or attributes of, a heightened scrutiny
equal protection group, however, are based upon stereotypes
rather than a factual assessment of an individual's ability to im-
raise complaints and is much more likely to ensure a reasoned decision by an
impartial jury.
173. Where the group in question has not experienced historical un-
derrepresentation or widespread discrimination in jury service, there
is minimal gain from granting protection against such discrimination;
similarly, where the group has little cohesiveness or recognizability as
a group, there is little possibility that the group will be stigmatized as
a result of the occasional exclusion that it might experience.
Sagawa, supra note 149, at 23.
174. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986). Indeed, "the impartial-
ity of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system." Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 688 (1987).
175. Courts must limit their inquiry to the interests of the government and
not of the parties. Thus, considerations regarding a litigant's interest in win-
ning are irrelevant. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 153, 204 (1989). As one commentator put it, "it is not the value of all
peremptory challenges - the peremptory challenge as an institution - that
should determine the weight of the state interest, but the value of unex-
plained peremptory challenges against members of discrete groups." Sagawa,
supra note 149, at 23.
176. Justice Burger, dissenting in Batson, misses the significance of this
point when he admits that the state's interest is to ensure a fair trial and that
this interest is substantial, if not compelling. Batson, 476 U.S. at 125.
Although Burger is correct in his statement, this interest is only compelling
when parties use peremptories to ensure a fair trial. When parties use per-
emptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, the court can no longer en-
sure a fair trial.
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partially consider the case.1 77 Without some further justifica-
tion to act on instinct, such challenges wholly fail to ensure an
impartial jury. Because an impartial jury cannot be obtained
through such challenges, the challenges do not advance a sub-
stantial or compelling state interest. 78 Consequently, courts
must conclude that such challenges violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Under equal protection analysis, courts must generally as-
sess the relationship between the state's goal and the action
which is the subject of the claim. Regarding peremptory chal-
lenges, courts should determine whether peremptories corre-
late to the fairness of trials. Because the above analysis yields
the conclusion that discriminatory peremptories do not ensure
an impartial jury, however, courts need not reach the issue of
whether factors such as gender, religion, or national origin have
any relation to fitness as a juror.179
A much different result occurs when parties exercise
peremptories based on something other than membership in, or
attributes of, a heightened scrutiny group. In these circum-
stances, a party need only provide a rational basis for a peremp-
tory challenge. Accordingly, this proposal does not hinder a
party's ability to remove a person due to characteristics such as
personality or attentiveness. For example, a court could ap-
prove peremptories based on a party's belief that removal of in-
attentive persons from a complicated case is more likely to
ensure a fair trial.180
177. "[P]eremptory challenges are often based on assumptions, fears, and
hunches, none of which would seem to translate into a compelling interest."
Robert L. Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory Use
of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 385, 409 (1985).
178. Assuming, arguendo, that empirical data were shown to conclusively
establish that membership in a group correlates with the outcome and imparti-
ality of jury verdicts, the harms which discriminatory peremptories cause
would not constitute substantial or compelling state interests. Nevertheless,
parties may still exercise some peremptories based on stereotypes. For exam-
ple, a prosecutor may believe that all professors are willing to give criminals a
second chance and will never convict for a first offense. Whether or not this
stereotype is true, professors do not constitute a cognizable group which war-
rants heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, the state need only have a rational ba-
sis, such as appeasing the prosecutor, to justify peremptories against
professors.
179. An insufficient state interest renders the second prong of this analysis
irrelevant.
180. Some parties will undoubtedly attempt to justify discriminatory per-
emptories by advancing neutral bases for removal. This Comment contends,
however, that Batson's shifting burdens will adequately allow courts to see
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C. EXPANDING DE GROSS WILL NOT RENDER PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES MEANINGLESS.
Immediately after the Supreme Court decided Batson v.
Kentucky, many predicted that Batson would render perempto-
ries meaningless.' 8 ' These dire prognostications have not come
to fruitation.'8 2 Other commentators reached the opposite con-
clusion, declaring that the shortcomings of Batson illustrate the
need to abolish peremptory challenges. 183 In the face of these
diametrically opposed views, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
underscored the importance of peremptory challenges. 184
Peremptory challenges serve to increase the likelihood of
ensuring an impartial jury. Their use, however, should not ex-
tend to permitting an attorney to shape a jury to ensure a
favorable decision.'85 Ideally, peremptory challenges would
help achieve impartial juries while serving many important
through such insincere explanations. See i,4fra notes 189-90 and accompanying
text.
181. See, e.g., State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) ("[If the use of
gender as a criterion for exercising peremptory challenges is prohibited, all
such challenges will become inherently suspect. Opposing counsel could de-
mand an alternative explanation for every challenge exercised. The damage
to the peremptory challenge, a vital component of trial by jury, would be enor-
mous, if not fatal."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could be
objected to on the basis that.., it constituted a 'classification' subject to equal
protection scrutiny.").
182. Instead, several states which have broadly prohibited peremptory
challenges based on certain group affiliations for more than a decade have
found no decay in peremptory challenges. Both California and Massachusetts
courts have found that the policies do not undermine the effectiveness of per-
emptory challenges. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1983) (en
banc); Commonwealth v. Reid, 424 N.E.2d 495, 500-01 (Mass. 1981).
183. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 48, at 227-29; Hanratty, supra note 138
at 239-40; Harris, supra note 147, at 1062; Rosemary Purtell, The Continued
Use of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky: Is
the Only Alternative to Eliminate the Peremptory Challenge Itsel?, 23 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 221, 257-60 (1988); Alschuler, supra note 175, at 206-09; Sagawa,
supra note 149, at 44-47. At least one Supreme Court Justice has also advo-
cated this position. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
184. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. Batson does not elevate
peremptories to the level of a challenge for cause, since a party must first
claim and present evidence of such discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
This commitment, coupled with the Batson court's decision to limit rather
than abolish peremptories, supports the belief that the Supreme Court does
not favor abolition of peremptory challenges. Jo, supra note 153, at 1326.
185. Robert L. Pidcock, Note, Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges in Jury Selection, 29 N.M. L. REV. 563, 573 (1989).
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purposes'8 6 apart from the purpose of challenges for cause.187
Courts can obtain the proper balance by prohibiting per-
emptory challenges based on membership in, or attributes of, a
heightened scrutiny equal protection group. Admittedly, trial
courts will need to scrutinize the justifications for peremptory
challenges.' 88 The procedural shifting of burdens developed in
Batson, however, will aid lower courts in making such
decisions. Additionally, lower courts have now applied Batson
for more than six years. The courts, therefore, cannot claim
that application on a somewhat broader scale is overly
burdensome. 8 9
Expansion of Batson enhances respect for peremptories
and for decisions made without discriminatory peremptories,
rather than rendering peremptories meaningless. Practitioners
can still rely on factors such as personality, responsiveness, and
186. One survey found that the majority of trial lawyers considered a jury's
composition to be either "important" or "very important." See Jeffery R.
Boyll, Behavioral Trial Consulting: What do Practicing Attorneys Think?, 13
TRIAL DIPL. J. 97, 99 (1990). For a summary of the major functions of peremp-
tory challenges, see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's
Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal
Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 828-29 (1989).
187. One major distinction between challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges is that the former requires that a court find an admitted or appar-
ent prejudice whereas the latter permits a party to exclude prospective jurors
for unconscious or unexpressed biases. Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Pre-
serving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 554 (1975); Andrea B.
Horowitz, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Strike Against Peremptory Challenges,
1990 Wis. L. REV. 219, 223-24 (1990); Joe Marcum, Note, Mitchell v. State: Con-
tinuing Erosion of the Peremptory Challenge in Equal Protection Litigation,
42 ARK. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1989); Jo, supra note 153, at 1326. Because attor-
neys can challenge for cause when the bias is apparent, they still need per-
emptories to remove jurors they believe are biased but who deny bias on voir
dire. VAN DYKE, supra note 12, at 146. This is especially true if one believes
that "[a] juror's general promise to be fair is relatively meaningless." ROBERT
A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 62 (2d ed. 1988).
188. A number of evidentiary and procedural problems have occurred
under Batson. This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
an excellent analysis of problems and possible solutions, however, see David
D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Chal-
lenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REV. 811, 826-38
(1988). If courts do not take such measures, many of Justice Marshall's con-
cerns regarding continued discrimination may come true. See Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
189. While some argue that such a proposal is unworkable and unmanage-
able, mere administrative convenience is insufficient to justify denial of consti-
tutional rights. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08
(1989) (holding that administrative convenience, standing alone, does not jus-
tify the use of a suspect classification under equal protection strict scrutiny).
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characteristics such as being a leader or follower to achieve an
impartial jury.19° Rather than relying on discriminatory stereo-
types, consideration of these factors, coupled with a prospective
juror's personal experiences, are infinitely more likely to pro-
cure an impartial jury.' 9' Concurrently, parties, jurors, and the
community will hold greater respect for the decisions which
our judicial system then renders.
CONCLUSION
The notion that peremptory challenges allow a party to ex-
clude a juror for any reason clashes with the tenets of the
Equal Protection Clause. Batson v. Kentucky intensified this
tension by holding that peremptory challenges based on the
race of a juror are unconstitutional. United States v. De Gross
correctly extended the Batson doctrine to gender-based
peremptories.
In the wake of De Gross, future courts must determine the
doctrine's proper breadth. Equal protection analysis of govern-
mental interests yields the conclusion that peremptories can
survive merely a rational basis scrutiny. Thus, courts must pro-
hibit peremptory challenges based on heightened scrutiny equal
protection groups. Equal protection principles must prevail in
the tension between peremptory challenges and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because of the peremptory's purpose in ensuring
an impartial, rather than a favorable jury. This resolution will
enhance the likelihood of an impartial jury, increase respect for
the use of peremptory challenges, and create much greater re-
spect for our judicial system.
190. Steinberg, supra note 48, at 867-68. Other typical grounds may include
inattentiveness, inability to comprehend issues in a complicated case, or any of
a large variety of other reasons.
191. WENKE, supra note 187, at 62.
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